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As construed by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement 
regulates overt, non-regulatory government searches of homes, cars, and personal effects–and 
virtually nothing else. This essay is primarily about how we got to this point.  It is fashionable to 
place much of the blame for today’s law on the Warren Court’s adoption of the malleable 
expectation of privacy concept as the core value protected by the Fourth Amendment.  But this 
diagnosis fails to explain why even the more liberal justices have often gone along with many of 
the privacy-diminishing holdings of the Court.  This essay argues that three other liberal 
dogmas–the probable cause-forever position, the individualized suspicion mantra, and the 
obsession with exclusion as a remedy–are the primary reasons we have a Fourth Amendment 
Lite.  When a search requires probable cause to be constitutional, courts are naturally more 
reluctant to denominate every police attempt to find evidence a search. When suspicion must be 
individualized, they are more likely to gloss over the harms caused by investigations of groups.  
And when the sole serious sanction for an illegal search or seizure is suppression at trial, many 
judges have less sympathy for viable claims, because they cannot stomach dismissal of criminal 
charges against guilty people.  Of course, another explanation for the less-than-robust state of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that the Supreme Court is concerned about shackling 
government law enforcement efforts.  But this essay also demonstrates that a more moderate 
approach than the liberal canon can provide greater Fourth Amendment protection than the 
current regime without further diminishing law enforcement effectiveness.    
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As construed by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirement regulates overt, non-regulatory government searches of homes, cars, and personal 
effects–and virtually nothing else.  According to the Court, the Fourth Amendment is mute about 
undercover searches (inside the home or out), inspections of welfare mothers’ and probationers’ 
homes, flyovers of curtilage and trespasses on property beyond it, surveillance of public 
movements, most compelled testing for drugs and alcohol, dog sniffs of cars and luggage, and 
rummaging through garbage.1 And the Amendment is close to irrelevant in a host of other 
situations, including subpoenas for documents, checkpoints for drunk driving and illegal 
immigration, residential and business health and safety inspections, and searches of junkyards for 
stolen parts.2 Under current constitutional doctrine, the government needs no justification to 
engage in the first set of actions, and so little to carry out the second that it is virtually 
unregulated.   
 
This essay is not about whether this state of affairs is good or bad.  Rather, it is about 
how we got to this point.  In the following pages, I try to lay out the etiology of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
A crucial initial assumption in this essay is that, at bottom, neither the language or the 
legislative history of the Fourth Amendment drives the analysis on this issue.  For instance, 
contrary to current doctrine, the Court could have decided that all suspicionless efforts at 
gathering evidence of crime are unreasonable,3 just as it could have held that home arrests do not 
require a warrant and that searches of cars do not require probable cause,4 without offending 
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1See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)(informant in the home); On Lee v. United States, 343 
U.S. 747 (1952)(informant in a business); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (welfare inspections); Samson v. 
California, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (probationers); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 27 (1986) (flyovers); Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (open field); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (public surveillance); Bd. 
Educ. Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 546 U.S. 822 (2002) (drug testing of students); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696 (1983); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)(dog sniff of car); California v Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
2United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), but see United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000); 
Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 
(1976) (illegal immigrant checkpoints); Camara v. Munc. Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (health and safety inspections); 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (junkyards). 
3See Kyllo v. United States, 53 U.S. 27, 33 n.1 (2001) (“When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as 
now, to ‘search’ meant ‘[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore to examine by 
inspection . . .”).  
4See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603-04 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s 
rule requiring warrants for non-exigent arrests “finds little or not support in the common law or in the text and 
history of the Fourth Amendment”); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-69 (1976) (detailing reasons 
cars are associated with a lesser expectation of privacy than homes). 
3either the text of the Amendment or the values of the Framers.  I am looking for socio-political 
explanations for our current Fourth Amendment doctrine, not formalistic ones. 
 
The most obvious such explanation for the decisions referenced above is that the 
Supreme Court is concerned about shackling government law enforcement efforts.  Undoubtedly, 
that is a large part of the answer.  But it is not the entire story.  As I have suggested elsewhere5
(and briefly explain again here), effective crime control and a more activist interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment are not necessarily mutually exclusive.   
 
Other explanations for the Court’s less-than-robust reading of the Fourth Amendment 
focus on the ironic consequences of decisions, mostly generated by the relatively “liberal” 
Warren Court, that was meant to expand its scope.  For instance, it is fashionable to place much 
of the blame for today’s law on the Warren Court’s adoption of privacy as the core value 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.  This move, in Katz v. United States,6 was hailed at the 
time as a major enhancement of constitutional protection against government intrusion.  As many 
have pointed out, however, because privacy is a manipulable concept, the Court has since found 
it easy to declare that a large array of police actions–ranging from use of informants to public 
surveillance and workplace drug testing–either do not implicate or are only limply protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.7 This diagnosis has some attraction as well, but fails to explain why 
even the more liberal justices have often gone along with many of the privacy-diminishing 
holdings of the Court.  
 
In this essay, I too suggest that the modern Court’s early expansive stances on the Fourth 
Amendment have ultimately led to a diminished Fourth Amendment.  But Katz’ expectation-of-
privacy formulation is not the culprit.  Rather, three other liberal dogmas–what I call the 
probable cause-forever position, the individualized suspicion mantra, and the obsession with 
exclusion as a remedy–are the primary reasons we have a Fourth Amendment Lite.  The end-
logic of these three dogmas produce such unappealing results that even moderate and liberal 
justices have balked at them, leaving us with a search and seizure jurisprudence that is much less 
than it could be.  When a search requires probable cause to be constitutional, courts are naturally 
more reluctant to denominate every police attempt to find evidence a search. When suspicion 
must be individualized, they are more likely to gloss over the harms caused by investigations of 
groups.  And when the sole serious sanction for an illegal search or seizure is suppression at trial, 
many judges have less sympathy for viable claims, because they cannot stomach dismissal of 
criminal charges against guilty people. 
 
5Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1991) (hereafter 
Fourth Amendment); Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality 
Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053 (1998) (hereafter Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle). 
6389 U.S. 847 (1967). 
7See infra note 25 for a listing. 
4I.  Probable Cause Forever 
 
Of course, probable cause is not required for every police action that is called a search or 
seizure.  Terry v. Ohio,8 a Warren Court decision, stands for the proposition that both detentions 
short of arrest and patdowns of outer clothing are permissible on reasonable suspicion, which 
represents a certainty level somewhere below the even-chance threshold often associated with 
probable cause.  The Terry Court was willing to relax Fourth Amendment strictures with respect 
to stops and frisks because the government’s interest in “effective crime prevention and 
detection” on the streets justified the “brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the 
sanctity of the person” that these actions occasion.9
In the seizure context, the post-Warren Court has routinely relied on this balancing 
approach–or what I have called the “proportionality principle”–in holding that several different 
types of detentions short of an arrest may take place on less than probable cause.10 In the search 
context, however, it has been much less willing to follow this route. Instead, the Court has 
insisted, in the words of Justice Stewart in Katz, that “searches conducted . . . without prior 
approval by judge of magistrate [and therefore without probable cause], are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”11 Almost twenty years later, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,12 a much more conservative 
Court similarly stated, “[o]rdinarily, a search–even one that may permissibly be carried out 
without a warrant–must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe that a violation has 
occurred.”13 
T.L.O. then went on to hold that probable cause was not required to search a school 
child’s purse for evidence of disciplinary infractions, thereby creating the one major exception 
(other than Terry’s frisk rule) to the probable cause-forever dogma.  Labeled the “special needs” 
doctrine, a phrase taken from Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in T.L.O., the exception requires 
only that government action be “reasonable,”14 which in practice has meant that neither a warrant 
or probable cause is required. But the special needs exception is usually only applicable when, as 
in T.L.O., those conducting the government action are not police and are pursuing some end 
other than ordinary criminal law enforcement (e.g., school disciplinary searches, drug testing for 
administrative purposes, checkpoints for immigrants, or inspections of  businesses for regulatory, 
health and safety violations).15 Indeed, the classic statement of the special needs paradigm is that 
it kicks in only when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
 
8392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
9392 U.S. at 26. 
10See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)(checkpoints); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
434 U.S. 106 (1977)(seizure of car occupants); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)(detention after issuance of 
citation); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)(detention of occupant during search of house). 
11389 U.S. at 357. 
12469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
13Id. at 340. 
14See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CASES AND CONCEPTS, ch. 13 (4th ed. 2000).  
15See id. 
5warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”16 The Court has on several occasions 
called these special needs situations “exceptional” and “limited.”17 In other words, outside of 
frisks, the usual law enforcement search for evidence of criminal activity requires probable 
cause.18 
While that outcome may please many who favor strong Fourth Amendment protection, 
its ultimate effect has been just the reverse. For the consequence of the Court’s rigid adherence 
to the probable cause standard for searches has been judicial reluctance to apply the latter term 
even to government actions that clearly involve looking for evidence of crime.  Instead, a wide 
array of intrusive police actions–flyovers of backyards, open field trespasses, undercover 
activity–have been immunized from Fourth Amendment strictures.  Like the stop and frisk at 
issue in Terry, these types of investigative techniques are usually exploratory, and thus usually 
based on only a smidgeon of suspicion, rather than probable cause.  And without these 
techniques, probable cause might never be developed.  When forced to choose between ending 
such actions or permitting them whenever police want to use them, even many aggressive civil 
liberations might choose the latter route. It is no surprise that the Supreme Court, which has to 
worry about both sides of the balance, has done so.   Thus, in holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not govern use of undercover agents to gain entry to the home, Chief Justice 
Warren himself stated “[w]ere we to hold the deceptions of the agent in this case constitutionally 
prohibited, we would come near to a rule that the use of undercover agents in any manner is 
virtually unconstitutional per se.”19 
Consider three other examples reflective of this dilemma.  In United States v. Knotts20 the 
Court declared that using a beeper to track public movements does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment. In United States v. Miller21 and Smith v. Maryland22 it held, respectively, that 
government subpoenas for bank records and government requests for phone records do not 
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Much can be said against the Court’s rationale in these 
cases which, put simply, is that anything we expose to others is no longer private vis-a-vis the 
government; the Court’s stance that we assume the risk of police discovery in such situations has 
been roundly criticized by scores of commentators.23 Yet had the Court decided to the contrary 
in these three cases, its probable cause-forever dogma would have been triggered, thereby 
banning public electronic tracking of any individual whom the police couldn’t already arrest, and 
 
16New Jersey v. T.L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
17Ibid. (“exceptional); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74-75 (2001) (same); Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass.,  489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)(“limited”). 
18It is possible to come up with other exceptions, e.g., inventory searches,  Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 
640 (1983) and border searches, but even in these situations one could say the special needs moniker fits, either 
because the search is for purposes other than finding evidence of crime, or is conducted by non-police, or both. 
19Lewis v. United States, 255 U.S. 206, 210 (1966). 
20460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
21425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
22442 U.S.735 (1979). 
23United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that “the disclosure by 
individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to 
participate in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account”); WAYNE LAFAVE ET 
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 3.2(j).  
6invalidating most subpoenas, even those aimed at businesses and other organizations, despite the 
fact that both practices are crucial first-stage law enforcement techniques.  That prospect must 
have been daunting.  Indeed, even the “liberal” justices signed on to the unanimous Knotts 
opinion, only Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions in Miller, and only they 
plus Stewart dissented in Smith; moreover, only Marshall was adamant about requiring a warrant 
in the latter two cases.24 
Given these developments, some have argued, as I noted above, that the real problem in 
these cases is not the probable cause requirement but Katz’ adoption of privacy as the linchpin of 
Fourth Amendment analysis.  Various other concepts–among them, government-citizen trust, 
coercion and property–have been proposed as substitutes.25 I have argued elsewhere that none of 
these concepts satisfactorily capture the gravamen of the Fourth Amendment.26 But even 
assuming one or more of these alternatives is conceptually viable, there is no reason to believe 
that any of them would have fared better in dealing with the probable cause conundrum.  
 
Consider property, probably the most commonly touted substitute for privacy as the core 
Fourth Amendment value.  Of course, privacy analysis takes property interests into account; one 
has more of a privacy interest in a house one owns or rents than in a house that one temporarily 
occupies as a guest.   Commentators such as Morgan Cloud, however, seem to want a Fourth 
Amendment “rooted in property theories.”27 Cloud prefers this approach in large part because, 
he says, property concepts are less “malleable” than privacy concepts and thus less likely to 
permit significant encroachments on the Fourth Amendment’s scope.28 But property doctrine is 
eminently manipulable as well: back in the heyday of the property-oriented approach to the 
Fourth Amendment the Court had no problem permitting suspicionless searches of privately-
owned open fields.29 The definition of criminal “instrumentalities” was also stretched beyond 
recognition so that government could assert a superior possessory interest over personal 
property,30 a ploy that would be vastly facilitated today by the advent of forfeiture statutes giving 
government an interest in any item with a “nexus” to criminal activity.31 Worse yet, surveillance 
 
24Brennan and Marshall clearly called for a probable cause requirement in Smith. 442 U.S., 751.  However, 
Stewart’s opinion in that case merely stated that phone numbers fall “within the constitutional protection recognized 
in Katz,” without indicating whether a warrant was required to obtain them.  Id. at 747.   In Miller, Brennan simply 
spoke of requiring “appropriate legal process,” without specifying what that might mean.  425 U.S., 450.  Only 
Marshall explicitly stated he would require a warrant based on probable cause on Miller’s facts.  Id. at 456. 
25Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and 
Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751 (1994)(trust); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal 
Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016 (1995); Morgan Cloud,  A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court 
Dismantled the Fourth Amendment, 3 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 33 (2005)(property) 
26Christopher Slobogin, Rejuvenation, supra note 5, at 1057-62.  
27Cloud, supra note 25, at 72.  
28Id.  Cloud also argues that this approach, taking its cue from Boyd, would provide almost absolute 
protection for particularly private papers, communications and the like, but of course a privacy-based Fourth 
Amendment can accomplish the same goal.   
29Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
30See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302 (1967)(“depending on the circumstances, the same ‘papers and 
effects’ may be ‘mere evidence’ in one case and ‘instrumentality’ in another.”).  
31See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 
University of Chicago Law Review 35, 42-56 (1998) (detailing the breadth of today’s forfeiture statutes).  
7of any kind could easily be said to be ungoverned by the Fourth Amendment in a property-
oriented regime, since it does not involve physical trespass.32 In other words, even had the Court 
adhered to a property-based Fourth Amendment, it could have (and undoubtedly would have) 
succumbed to the anti-regulatory pressure created by the probable cause-forever position.  
 
The allegiance to a unitary probable cause standard has still one other downside: the 
minimization of ex ante review as a regulatory option for searches that don’t require probable 
cause.  As Justice Scalia stated in Griffin v. Wisconsin, “[t]he Constitution prescribes . . . that 
where the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant, it is also of such a nature as 
to require probable cause.”33 The converse of this statement, at least as far as the Court is 
concerned, is that if probable cause is not required, neither is a warrant.  Thus, the suggestion by 
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Griffin that the search of a probationer’s home should be 
considered reasonable only if authorized by a judge was brusquely dismissed by the majority 
once it found that such searches present a special needs situation outside normal law 
enforcement.34 According to the majority, a court order based on less than probable cause is “a 
combination that neither the text of the Constitution nor any of our prior decisions permits.”35 
The idea that a court could issue an order on mere reasonable suspicion or something less in 
connection with normal law enforcement would likely be even more oxymoronic to the justices 
who joined this language.  
 
In a variety of ways, then, the probable cause-forever dogma forces courts grappling with 
the realities of law enforcement to exempt many varieties of surveillance from the Fourth 
Amendment’s restrictions.  That dogma is not required by the Fourth Amendment, however.  
The Fourth Amendment only requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. 
 
That declaration, of course, conjures up the specter of a Fourth Amendment swallowed 
up entirely by the special needs exception.  But there are other ways of conceptualizing 
reasonableness. I have argued that the Fourth Amendment would be much better served through 
the adoption of two principles–the aforementioned proportionality principle, and the exigency 
principle.36 The proportionality principle allows courts to modulate the cause needed to carry 
out a search depending upon its intrusiveness.  Under the proportionality approach, searches of 
houses would require more cause than searches of open fields, but both would require 
justification, just as arrests require more cause than stops, but both are governed by the Fourth 
Amendment.  The exigency principle requires ex ante review of any non-exigent search–even 
one that does not require probable cause under proportionality analysis.  Yet that principle does 
not have to be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause if, as some Court 
decisions seem to contemplate, one is willing to adopt a sliding scale definition of probable cause 
 
32This was the gist of Justice Black’s dissent in Katz, where he argued the words search and seizure 
“connote the ideal of tangible things with size, form and weight, things capable of being searched, seized, or both.”  
389 U.S. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting). 
33483 U.S. 868, 877 (1987). 
34Id. at 877-78. 
35Id. at 877. 
36Slobogin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 5; Slobogin, Rejuvenation, supra note 5. 
8so that warrants can issue on varying degrees of cause,37 or if the ex ante review is conducted by 
someone other than a judge or is called something besides a warrant, moves which even Scalia 
has conceded are possible in special needs situations.38 
The proportionality and exigency principles ameliorate the pressure created by the 
probable cause-forever stance without sacrificing the core protection of the Fourth Amendment.  
Under this regime, courts would be more willing to say that police attempts to find evidence are 
“searches” because the consequence of such a holding would not be as dramatic.  For instance, 
undercover work, even if called a search, might only require probable cause when it involves 
long-term infiltration.39 Observation of public activities like the tracking that occurred in Knotts 
could more easily be denominated  a Fourth Amendment event because they could be justified 
on a lesser showing, given their lesser intrusiveness.40 And all subpoenas for records could more 
comfortably be called searches because only subpoenas for personal records like those sought in 
Miller or Smith would require heightened cause; subpoenas for impersonal, organizational 
records could be obtained on the traditional relevance grounds.41 
Under the proposed regime, then, courts could more easily avoid the temptation to define 
the Fourth Amendment threshold in terms of assumptions of risk, and might be more willing to 
speak of that threshold in the terms Katz originally stood for:  expectations of privacy society 
recognizes as reasonable.42 I do not pretend that their usefulness in resolving Fourth 
Amendment conundrums alone is sufficient reason to adopt the proportionality and exigency 
principles.43 But particularly in this day of heightened concern over security, a Fourth 
 
37This is the precise approach the Court adopted in Camara v. Muncipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967), where 
the Court required “probable cause” for residential inspections, defined in terms of whether there was cause to 
believe a particular area of houses, because of their age, number of previous inspections, etc., required checking. In 
that case, Justice White stated for the majority that “[t]he test of ‘probable cause’ required by the Fourth 
Amendment can take into account the nature of the search that is being sought” and that “[i]f a valid public interest 
justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant.”  Id. at 
539-40.    
38In Griffin, for instance, Scalia admitted that the Court had “arguably come to permit an exception to the 
[no warrants but on probable cause] prescription for administrative search warrants, which may but do not 
necessarily have to be issued by courts.”  Other decisions have contemplated judicial authorization on less than 
probable cause even in non-administrative settings.  See, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985)(“We . . . 
do not abandon the suggestion . . . that under circumscribed procedures, the Fourth Amendment might permit the 
judiciary to authorize the seizure of a person on less than probable cause and his removal to the police station for the 
purpose of fingerprinting.”); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 n.5 (1984)(suggesting that a warrant authorizing 
use of a beeper might permissibly be based on reasonable suspicion). 
39For further discussion of this approach, see Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext and Trickery: 
Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OREGON L. REV. 775, 805-08 (1997).  
40For explication of this point, see Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public 
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L. J. 213 (2002). 
41For explication of this point, see Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 
841-45 (2005). 
42This has been the official formulation of the Fourth Amendment’s threshold ever since Justice Harlan 
used the language in his concurring opinion in Katz. 389 U.S. at 360.  See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.s. 
35, 40-41 (1988).  
43For more normative arguments in their favor, see Slobogin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 5, at 29-37; 
68-75; Slobogin, Rejuvenation, supra note 5, at 1070-92. 
9Amendment theory’s pragmatic impact on judicial decision-making is far from an irrelevant 
consideration.  
 
II.  The Fixation on Individualized Suspicion 
 
Hand in glove with the Court’s probable cause doctrine is the individualized suspicion 
requirement. As the Court has stated, “A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the 
absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”44 That precept is normally a wise one.  But 
it cannot be honored when large groups of people are subjected to searches or seizures, like those 
that occur in connection with roadblocks, drug testing, public camera surveillance and data 
mining.  In these latter situations, an individualized suspicion requirement would stop the 
government’s investigation dead in its tracks. 
 
One response to this situation is to adhere to the individualized suspicion requirement and 
simply prohibit group searches. But that solution is as “unreasonable” as the eradication of first-
stage investigative techniques that occurs under a probable cause-forever stance.  Group searches 
are an important means of keeping us safe, a fact even liberal justices recognize. 
 
The Court’s approach, in contrast, has been to determine whether the group intrusion is a 
special needs situation.  If  “ordinary law enforcement” is involved, the Court continues to 
require individualized suspicion.45 In special needs situations, however, the Court has been 
satisfied with a bland assertion by the government that the group search or seizure is meant to 
deal with an unquantified “problem,” such as illegal immigration, drunk driving, business safety 
violations, or substance abuse among customs agents and school children.46 In other words, just 
as the probable cause dogma has encouraged a narrow definition of search, the individualized 
suspicion dogma has left the Court with no tools for dealing with group searches, with the result 
that it has essentially adopted a hands-off attitude toward them. 
 
The proportionality principle counsels an intermediate approach, requiring what I call 
“generalized suspicion.”  It would permit group searches, but only if there is reason to believe 
that the proportion of criminals likely to be so discovered roughly equals the hit rate associated 
with the intrusion involved.  For instance, if the government wants to conduct full searches of 
everyone in a group, it should generally have to show why there is reason to believe that 
approximately one out of two of those searches will produce evidence of crime (the statistical 
equivalent of probable cause).  Similarly, data mining using personal records of identifiable 
individuals ought to be able to finger viable suspects approximately half the time, given the 
intrusion involved.    
 
44City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
45Id. 
46See e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990) (noting the magnitude of the drunk driving 
problem nationwide); Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976) (noting that the illegal immigration problem is 
“substantial”); Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S.  661 (1995) (noting that drug infractions at the school in 
question had increased in recent years).   
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At least one caveat to this approach should be recognized, however.  When the 
government can show the intrusion is aimed at preventing harm from a person or persons in the 
group that is significant and imminent the cause requirement should probably be relaxed.   This 
exception recognizes a principle that has long been established in criminal law; for crimes like 
drunk driving, for instance, we allow conviction of those who create a significant and imminent 
harm even when the actual probability of harm posed by the defendant was low.  We should be 
able to conduct searches under like circumstances.47 Thus, for instance, the carnage that would 
follow from a terrorist act on a plane justifies suspicionless searches of groups at airports despite 
the extremely low likelihood that any one person boarding the plane is a hijacker.   Similarly, as 
the Court stated in dictum in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, “the Fourth Amendment would 
almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist 
attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.”48 
The “generalized suspicion” concept, combined with a strict dangerousness exception, 
pours content into the reasonableness inquiry, which otherwise permits government to justify 
actions affecting thousands of people based on vague assertions of need.  If the concept 
nonetheless strikes the reader as too technocratic or activist, consider the comments of Justice 
Scalia in his dissent in National Treasury Employee’s Union v. Von Raab,49 where the majority 
upheld drug testing of customs agents.  Scalia was livid about the holding, calling it “a kind of 
immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use.”50 Not normally 
associated with a fondness for detailed judicial oversight, Scalia nonetheless argued that the 
Court should have to find some “social necessity” before approving a drug testing program, and 
asserted that the majority provided no “real evidence of a real problem that will be solved by 
urine testing of Customs Service employees;” rather the majority’s holding was based on 
“nothing but speculation, and not very plausible speculation at that.”51 In support of this point, 
he noted that only 5 agents out of 3,600 Customs employees had tested positive for drugs.52 In 
other words, even Scalia recognizes that some type of concrete justification is needed before 
courts affirm government intrusions. 
 
The difficulty, of course, is determining what sort of justification is necessary.  Let us 
assume that drug testing deters and detects dangerous drug use.  On that (big) assumption, would 
100 positive tests have been enough to justify the drug testing program in Von Raab? Or would 
30 have been sufficient?  When is there “real evidence of a real problem”? The proportionality 
principle, working in tandem with the generalized suspicion concept, provides a way to answer 
these questions.  Assuming that the invasion associated with drug testing using a blood test 
should generally require probable cause (and that there is no airport-like significant and 
imminent danger presented by drug-using customs agents), the Court in Von Raab should have 
demanded that roughly half of the employees test positive in order to justify mass testing on a 
 
47Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 53-58 (2003).  
48531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000). 
49489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
50Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
51Id. at 681-82. 
52Id. at 683-84. 
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sustained basis. That number may seem high, but then so is the intrusiveness of a blood-drug 
test.53 
If one’s intuition is still that a mass drug testing program should not be so easily 
frustrated, consider the scenario from another perspective.  Over 7% of the American population 
as a whole, and 19% of those between 18 and 25, have used illegal drugs in the past 30 days.54 
If one believes, say, that 100 positive tests in the Von Raab sample (3% of the total) represents a 
“real problem,” then the Fourth Amendment would present no obstacle to nationwide drug 
testing (at least if one assumes that use of drugs by young adults can be just as dangerous as use 
of drugs by customs agents).   That result would be offensive to most, including, I would guess, 
the majority in Von Raab. In short, Fourth Amendment analysis should mimic equal protection 
rationality review “with bite,” if not strict scrutiny.55 
The exigency principle also places limitations on group searches.  As Scalia’s comments 
in Griffin, noted in the previous section, indicate, the Court’s special needs jurisprudence not 
only jettisons a warrant requirement, but appears to abandon all pretense of ex ante review.  The 
exigency principle, in contrast, would require such review before all non-exigent group searches, 
special or not, just as is required when a single house, person, paper or effect is searched. The 
rationale for this ex ante review requirement is the same as it is when individual search and 
seizures are involved.  Justice Jackson famously defended warrants as a means of forcing 
“inferences [to] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the 
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”56 That rationale 
doesn’t change simply because the government is no longer engaged in “ordinary” law 
enforcement.    
 
At the same time, the exigency principle does not pose the obstruction to law 
enforcement objectives that the probable cause-forever and individualized suspicion 
requirements do.  Ex ante review would only be required when there is time to obtain it.  
Furthermore, when the justification requirement is below probable cause, as is often true with 
group searches, the second opinion does not have to come from a judge.  For instance, school 
locker searches might be approved by principals, and public camera installation might be 
authorized by any high level, politically accountable official who is divorced from front-line law 
enforcement.   
 
53Perhaps, as the Supreme Court has suggested, when everyone in a group is subject to the government 
action (or those searched are selected according to neutral criteria), the perceived intrusiveness that flows from being 
targeted is lessened.  See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).  But this rationale must be applied 
cautiously; carried to its logical conclusion, government could evade the fourth amendment simply by searching 
everyone.    
54Office of National Drug Control Policy, Drug Use Trends, Oct. 2002, available at 
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/druguse/index.html (table). 
55See Slobogin, Rejuvenation, supra note 5, at 1089-90.  Of course, if 50% of the country were using illegal 
drugs, the logic of the proportionality principle would authorize nationwide testing.  Perhaps that outcome suggests 
limits on the proportionality principle.  But it may also suggest something about the sensibleness of the relevant 
substantive criminal law.    
56Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,14(1948). 
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III.  The Obsession with Exclusion 
 
Since 1961, when the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio,57 exclusion has been the 
remedy of choice when the Fourth Amendment is violated.  The Mapp Court was convinced that 
other remedies were “worthless and futile,” and that, in any event, both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments required suppression of illegally obtained evidence.58 The post-Warren Court has 
completely eliminated the Fifth Amendment basis for the rule,59 and pretty much done away with 
its Fourth Amendment foundation as well, insisting that it is merely a judicially-created remedy 
designed to deter police misconduct.60 Yet suppression of the fruit of the illegality remains the 
primary sanction for Fourth Amendment violations.  In the meantime, administrative and 
damages remedies have atrophied or been explicitly narrowed by a Supreme Court hostile to 
lawsuits against law enforcement agents and their employers.61 
Elsewhere I have discussed at length how the exclusionary rule undermines civil liberties, 
albeit unintentionally and indirectly (as is true with the probable cause and individualized 
suspicion dogmas).62 First, the rule is ineffective as a deterrent, in either the specific or general 
sense, because it seldom comes into play and is only an indirect punishment when it does so. 
Police know that most questionable searches and seizures never result in arrest or prosecution, 
and that many of those that do will not trigger a suppression hearing because of the prevalence of 
plea bargaining. When a hearing does take place, miscreant officers often prevail because of 
perjury and the hindsight biasing effect of judicial knowledge that criminal evidence was found.  
Even when evidence is suppressed, the prosecutor is hurt much more than the officer, whose 
primary goal is obtaining “collars,” not convictions, and whose superiors are likely to be 
sympathetic to aggressive policework as long as it does not result in egregious abuse.63 The 
latter point also helps explain why the rule does not have much of a “systemic” effect either.  
Research strongly suggests that training programs (run by these same superiors or supervisors 
like them) routinely slight constitutional issues and that officers are not well-versed in Fourth 
Amendment law.64 
It is the damage to that law that is the exclusionary rule’s most insidious effect, however.  
The exclusionary remedy ensures that the only Fourth Amendment claims most judges see are 
 
57367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
58Id. at 652, 648-49.. 
59See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S 463 (1976) (holding that the Fifth Amendment is never violated 
when police seize voluntarily created papers).   
60United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1973) (“In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”). 
61See generally Whitebread & Slobogin, Criminal Procedure, 48-59 (discussing the good faith, policy, and 
concrete damages limitations on damages actions under Section 1983).  
62Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 ILL. L. REV. 363 (1979).  
63Id. at 374-79. 
64Id. at 393-94 (describing nonchalance toward constitutional issues in both academy and field training and 
several studies showing that police perform barely better than chance on questions concerning Fourth Amendment 
law). 
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brought by guilty people seeking to elude conviction.  Thus, the people responsible for 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment are virtually never confronted by a breach of privacy claim 
from an innocent individual.  To the contrary, in the typical case they know that vindication of 
the claim will diminish or end any possibility of punishing an obvious criminal.  That is hardly a 
prescription for a fair, open-minded assessment of Fourth Amendment issues. 
 
The best argument for retaining the rule despite its flaws is that current alternatives to it 
are worse.   Police are not good at policing themselves, criminal prosecution against misbehaving 
officers will usually be overkill, and damages suits are seldom brought and seldom won because 
of plaintiffs’ ignorance of their rights, the expense of civil litigation, the inchoate nature of the 
injury (which deters lawyers as well as potential plaintiffs from bringing suit), the biases of juries 
and, as with the suppression remedy, the efficacy of police perjury. Furthermore, even if the 
officer loses, he or she is usually indemnified, judgment proof, or both, minimizing the impact of 
the verdict on the officer.65 
A damages action need not be so punchless, however.  I have proposed a different 
damages regime, which would consist of several core components: (1) a liquidated 
damages/penalty for all unconstitutional actions, preferably based on the average officer’s salary; 
(2) non-indemnifiable personal liability, at the liquidated damages sum, of officers who 
knowingly or recklessly violate the Fourth Amendment; (3) entity liability, at the liquidated 
damages sum, for all other violations; (4) state-paid legal assistance for those with Fourth 
Amendment claims; and (5) a  judicial decisionmaker.66 With these components in place, 
innocent people as well as criminals will have an incentive to bring Fourth Amendment claims, 
officers who knowingly or recklessly violate the Fourth Amendment will receive direct, 
unalloyed punishment, and departments will have a financial incentive to ensure that their 
employees know the law.  Just as important, judges will be more likely to acknowledge the true 
base rate of unconstitutional actions, because they will see before them numerous people who 
were searched and found to have no evidence of crime in their pockets, homes or records.  Under 
these conditions, judges are more likely to evaluate accurately the overall societal impact of 
progovernment findings (as well as much less likely to condone perjury).  In short, in a damages 
regimes of the type described here judges will be forced to internalize the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment–protecting the privacy and autonomy interests of all citizens.   
 
Additionally, a damages regime is a much better remedial fit for certain types of Fourth 
Amendment violations.  As the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hudson v. Michigan notes, 
exclusion may meaningfully vindicate Fourth Amendment rules meant to “prevent[] the 
government from seeing or taking evidence,” but it does not as clearly serve interests protected 
by other rules.67 Thus in Hudson the Court rejected exclusion as a remedy for a violation of the 
knock-and-announce rule, because that rule is meant to prevent unnecessary destruction of 
property and minimize violence by or embarrassment of a surprised resident, interests which 
have little to do with the subsequently seized evidence (for which the police in Hudson had 
 
65Id. at 384-86. 
66Id. at 442. 
67126 S.Ct., 2159, 2165 (2006). 
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probable cause and a warrant).68 A damages action compensating the individual for injury to 
person or property would make much more sense in this situation.  The same analysis suggests 
that exclusion is not a good remedy for other execution rules, as well as post-search rules such as 
record-keeping and periodic review requirements.69 Most important, as has often been pointed 
out, exclusion provides no remedy for the innocent victims of police misconduct.  
 
I am not arguing for replacement of the exclusionary rule with a damages regime, 
although a persuasive argument to that effect can be made.  Rather, I am saying that the 
dominance of the exclusionary rule has been one of many reasons judicial endorsement of a 
robust Fourth Amendment has been stymied.   And I am saying that without a meaningful 
damages regime, the Fourth Amendment law that we do have is not likely to make much of a 
practical difference. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court’s adherence to the probable cause standard, the individualized suspicion 
requirement, and the exclusionary remedy is either short-sighted or disingenuous (depending 
upon the extent to which the justices understand and care about the effects of these precepts).  
None of these doctrines is required by the Fourth Amendment.  Instead, the proportionality and 
exigency principles should govern, and a realistic damages regime instituted. 
 
These latter recommendations are not ivory tower prescriptions.  Chief Justice Warren 
Burger proposed replacing the exclusionary rule with an administrative damages scheme similar 
to the one I have outlined here.70 Despite its rejection in cases like Griffin, the exigency 
principle embraces a commonsense notion that has been espoused in other Court opinions.71 
And the all-important proportionality principle derives directly from Terry v Ohio.   
 
The probable cause, individualized suspicion and exclusionary rule dogmas are all 
revered by those who want a vigorous Fourth Amendment.  Unfortunately, these dogmas have 
backfired.  They have fed, rather than restrained, the temptation to give government leeway in its 
law enforcement efforts.  The good news is that more moderate positions are both consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment and more likely to lead to its full implementation.  
 
68Id. 
69See Slobogin, supra note 42, at 401-02 (arguing that exclusion is a poor fit when an arrest is unreasonably 
executed, an inventory is not filed, or an arrest involves excessive force).  
70Bivens v. Six Named Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
71See Whitebread & Slobogin, supra note 14, at 139, 141 (summarizing exceptions to warrant requirement). 
